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Abstract: There has been much recent debate on the impact of competition on the
English National Health Service (NHS). However, studies have tended to view
competition in isolation and are controversial. This study examines the impact of
programme theories associated with the health system reforms, which sought to
move from a dominant target-led ‘central control’ programme theory, to one based
on ‘market forces’, on orthopaedics across six case-study local health economies.
It draws on a realistic evaluation approach to open up the policy ‘black box’ across
different contexts using a mixed methods approach: analysis of 152 interviews
with key informants and analysis of waiting times and admissions. We ﬁnd that the
urban health economies were more successful in reaching the access targets than
the rural health economies, although the gap in performance closed over time.
Most interviewees were aware of the policies to increase choice and competition,
but their role appeared comparatively weak. Local commissioners’ ability to
inﬂuence demand appeared limited with providers’ incentives dominating service
delivery. Looking forward, it is clear that the role of competition in the NHS has to
be considered alongside, rather than in isolation from, other policy mechanisms.
Received 15 February 2013; revised 2 January 2014; accepted 21 January 2014
Introduction
Since Enthoven’s (1985: 3, 42) call to introduce ‘powerful incentives for National
Health Service (NHS) personnel to serve patients as efﬁciently as possible’, which
*Correspondence to: Dr Hugh McLeod, Health Economics Unit, University of Birmingham, Public Health
Building, Birmingham B15 2TT, UK. Email: h.s.t.mcleod@bham.ac.uk
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concluded that ‘there is nothing like a competitive market to motivate quality and
economy of service’, policy makers have sought to promote competition between
hospital providers. The United Kingdom has led international interest in the role
of market-based incentives to deliver efﬁciency and quality objectives since 1991
(Hunter, 2011; Mays et al., 2011; Propper, 2012). According to Bevan and
Skellern (2011), studies of the NHS markets have generally used one of two
paradigms either using qualitative or mixed methods to analyse the effects of the
market on stakeholders (e.g. Audit Commission and Healthcare Commission,
2008; Brereton and Gubb, 2010; Frosini et al., 2012) or using econometric
methods to test the relationship between competition and quality (e.g. Propper
et al., 2004; Propper et al., 2008; Bloom et al., 2011; Cooper et al., 2011; Gaynor
et al., 2011; Gaynor et al., 2012).
Bevan and Skellern (2011) highlight that the different types of study have come
to different conclusions. Very broadly, the ﬁrst group ‘found little hard evidence of
systemic improvements attributable to competition arising from patient choice or
selective contracting by purchasers’ (Bevan and Skellern, 2011: 2). The second
group suggest a positive relationship between greater competition and quality
during the New Labour government administration (1997–2010) when ﬁxed
prices were introduced for many hospital services (Bloom et al., 2011; Cooper
et al., 2011; Gaynor et al., 2011). These studies rely on a number of key
assumptions including a spillover effect, such that competition for elective patients
will drive improvements in hospital management resulting in higher quality for
both elective and emergency patients. This is important because the studies
have used deaths of emergency patients admitted for acute myocardial infarction
(AMI) as an outcome measure. The studies have proved highly controversial
(Bevan and Skellern, 2011; Pollock et al., 2011; Gravelle et al., 2012; Greener,
2012). The spillover effect has been questioned. Gravelle et al. (2012: iii, 32)
found that ‘in general quality measures are not highly correlated and often not
correlated at all’ and concluded that ‘the question of the existence and size of the
effect of competition on hospital quality in the NHS is not yet settled’. Bevan and
Skellern (2011: 3) argue that ‘the chain of causation is not adequately understood’
as the impact of competition for elective patients on management effort may not
have a consistent impact on the quality of other hospital services. Similarly,
Propper (2012) notes that there is a ‘black box’ in our understanding of exactly
what purchasers, managers and clinical practitioners do in response to competi-
tion that affects outcomes.
This study belongs to the ﬁrst group that analyses the effects of the market on
the various players, and aims to contribute towards illuminating the ‘black box’.
While some studies focus on patients and how providers respond (e.g. Dixon
et al., 2010), how these reforms have impacted on particular conditions has been
relatively underexplored. It explores producer views on competition within
orthopaedics across the wider policy mix, drawing on the framework of four
interrelated work streams (Department of Health (DH), 2005; see Figure 1) to
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examine the cumulative effect of policies since 2002 (see also Audit Commission
and Healthcare Commission, 2008; Brereton and Vasoodaven, 2010; Mays et al.,
2011). In doing so it aims to examine wider perspectives on ‘policy success’
(Marsh and McConnell, 2010) rather than single indicators such as reduction in
hospital mortality. Given the challenges in attributing change to a particular
policy or incentive given the complex interactions between potential causal and
confounding variables, the study adopts a realist perspective in arguing that it is
not enough to knowwhether a programme works, but to knowwhy it works, and
to uncover the stakeholders’ ‘programme theory’ of what works for whom in
particular circumstances (Pawson and Tilley, 1997; see also Pawson et al., 2005;
Greenhalgh et al., 2009; Millar et al., 2012).
The study achieves this by analysing how these combined reforms impacted on
the delivery of orthopaedic services across six case-study local health economies,
in their post-2006 primary care trust (PCT) conﬁgurations. Orthopaedics has
historically been a focus of concern as a high volume specialty that has struggled
to meet national access targets (Harrison and Appleby, 2005). The six PCTs were
chosen to illustrate a range of local contexts as we anticipated that the impact
of the reforms would be affected by a range of contextual factors and local con-
tingencies. In doing so it raises important questions about the role of competition
Transactional Reforms
Money follows the patient,
rewarding the best and most
efficient providers, giving 
others the incentive to improve
System Management
Reforms
Demand-Side Reforms
More choice and much
stronger voice for patients
More diverse providers, with
more freedom to innovate and 
improve services
Better care
Better patient 
experience
Better value 
for money
A framework which guarantees 
Quality assurance, safety, 
fairness, equity and 
value for money
Supply-Side Reforms
Figure 1. Framework for health reform in England. Source: DH (2005: 9)
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in the policy mix, and how might quality of care be improved in rural areas where
competition is unalterably weak (Bevan and Skellern, 2011).
Healthcare reform and orthopaedics
The New Labour government pursued a variety of policies, which it summarised
in terms of four reform streams (Figure 1). Broadly, the explicit policy trajectory
can be characterised in terms of evolution from initial dominance of ‘central
control’ programme theory, to the subsequent period in which market-orientated
mechanisms were gradually implemented (Mays et al., 2011). The policies
underlying these programme theories are detailed below in relation to their
implications for orthopaedic services. A more general analysis of the reform
streams has been reported by Millar et al. (2012).
System management reforms
The rule-based framework was arguably headed by the performance management
policy of national maximum waiting time targets (DH, 2005). The NHS Plan
(DH, 2000) published a target to reduce maximum waiting times for inpatient
treatment to six months by the end of 2005. Subsequent targets culminated in
the 18-week target from referral to treatment by the end of 2008. Waiting time
provided a measure of quality about which Trusts could compete for patients, and
maximum-wait targets provided a direct incentive for Trusts to change behaviour.
In addition to centrally managed support for poor performers, pressure on
executives to meet the targets was considerable, with organisation-level quality
ratings and job tenure at stake (Bevan and Hood, 2006). Orthopaedics was
host to a range of redesign initiatives intended to improve working practices
(Harrison and Appleby, 2005). However, nationally, orthopaedics was one of two
specialities not to reach the 18-week target by 2009.
The regulatory system also evolved. First published in 2002/2003, annual
performance measures for provider organisations and PCTs were intended to
provide a basis for promoting competition, as well as sanctions for poor performers.
The requirement to comply with the European working time directive and the
Modernising Medical Careers agenda also posed additional challenges.
The unprecedented increase in NHS funding under New Labour provided an
opportunity for policy makers to make additional resources available in support
of their objectives, such as reducing waiting times, such that opportunity costs
were subject to little scrutiny (Appleby et al., 2010).
Transactional reforms
Orthopaedic services were an intended beneﬁciary of the Payment by Results (PbR)
tariffs that were introduced from 2004/2005 to ‘incentivise expansion of elective
surgery so that waiting times fall’ by increasing the link between funding and activity
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for NHS providers (DH, 2002: 4). PbR heightened opportunities and challenges for
supply and demand-side reform. The evidence of the impact of competition
on selected efﬁciency measures after the introduction of PbR suggests that Trusts
located where competition was more feasible experienced gains compared with
other Trusts (Cooper et al., 2012). PbR has been the dominant transactional
reform, which, regardless of its potential to inﬂuence commissioners or competition
between providers, provided an incentive for acute providers to reduce costs
(Farrar et al., 2009).
Supply-side reforms
The creation of Foundation Trusts from 2004 changed the context in which
orthopaedics was delivered, heightening incentives to maximise revenue, and
underlining how success was articulated in terms of money following patients to
high performing providers. Failure was couched in terms of the potential takeover
of persistently poor performing Trusts and the imposition of ‘management with a
proven track record of success’ (DH, 2002: 29).
The introduction of independent sector treatment centres (ISTCs), announced
in two waves in 2003 and 2005, was intended to further increase capacity in
specialties performing weakly against access targets, including orthopaedics. The
location of ISTCs and the size of their initial ﬁve-year contracts were centrally
determined. Agreed ISTC capacity was funded, whether or not it was utilised,
based on a provider-speciﬁc premium to the relevant PbR tariffs. Although the
impact of ISTCs on reducing waiting times was limited (Naylor and Gregory,
2009), they formed part of a wider move to diversify providers and encourage
existing providers to improve productivity (Allen et al., 2012).
Demand-side reforms
From 2002, PCT commissioners were tasked to promote efﬁciency via contracting
for services from providers. The introduction of PbR increased the incentive for
commissioners to manage the associated ﬁnancial risk and minimise hospital demand
(Farrar et al., 2009), and the major reorganisation of PCTs, from 303 to 152 in 2006,
was intended to improve their effectiveness. However, the introduction of world class
commissioning (WCC) acknowledged the continuing weakness in the performance of
PCT commissioners (DH, 2007) with limited inﬂuence on acute providers (Smith
et al., 2005). In orthopaedics, local initiatives included introducing triage services to
manage hospital referrals, sometimes using explicit scoring criteria. The introduction
of choice of provider by patients from 2006 was intended to further strengthen the
potential ofmarket forces to deliver gains in efﬁciency and quality (Dixon et al., 2010).
Summary
The reform streams promoted numerous incentives and it is not surprising that at
among national policy-makers there ‘wasn’t a good understanding of how things
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[the four work streams] were meant to ﬁt together’ (Millar et al., 2012: 13). Given
the prominence of policies intended to enhance market forces, our hypothesis was
that better performance was likely in the delivery of orthopaedic services where
competition and choice were present in the local PCT context.
Methods
The evaluation of the inter-connection of policy processes and their impact on
orthopaedic services is challenging since it requires an understanding of both the
impact in relation to objectives (i.e. waiting times) and the associated processes
(i.e. the policy streams described above, and how these were inﬂuenced by
contextual factors). In order to achieve this, the study drew on Pawson and
Tilley’s (1997) ‘realistic evaluation’ conceptual framework, which facilitates
mixed-methods exploration of the relationship between context (geographical
and institutional factors but also a broader set of constraints, norms and values
held by stakeholders), mechanisms (stakeholders’ behaviour in the presence
of incentives associated with policy interventions), and outcomes (measures
of impact associated with the policy interventions including intended and
unintended consequences). This approach allowed us to test the hypothesis that
more competitive local environments would experience better performance.
The study utilised local health economies as its unit of analysis and purposively
selected six PCTs (geographical areas deﬁned by commissioning boundaries) on
the basis of three contextual variables. The main variable was ‘provider market’:
the extent to which the PCT offered the prospect of competitive behaviour
and choice between NHS providers. The selection was informed by data on the
average number of hospitals accessible within 30min at the level of Lower Super
Output Areas (LSOAs; Department for Transport, 2007). The mean number of
hospitals accessible within 30min at PCT-level was calculated as the mean of the
LSOA values for all LSOAs within each post-2006 PCT boundary. PCTs with a
‘high’ degree of provider competition had on average more than oneNHS hospital
accessible within 30min, while PCTs with a ‘low’ degree of provider competition
had on average less than one NHS hospital accessible within 30min. Two other
variables were also taken into account: Provider diversity sought to distinguish
between PCTs hosting independent and NHS providers and those with only NHS
Trust providers. In practice, this was a crude measure of diversity because patients
could potentially travel to an independent provider in another PCT locality.
History of partnership working was based on an assessment of three available
markers of integration between the PCT and local government: coterminous
boundaries; history of pooled budgets using arrangements introduced under
Section 31 of the Health Act 1999; and whether the PCT was a ‘long-term
conditions demonstrator’ site. PCTs with at least two of these three markers were
categorised as having ‘good’ partnership working. The PCTs selected represented
extremes where none of these markers were present (in two cases) and where all
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three were present (in four cases) (Powell et al., 2011). The criteria for PCT
categories were chosen for a wider study of services for diabetes andmental health
in addition to orthopaedics, and the history of partnership working criterion
was not expected to have a major impact on orthopaedic services (Powell et al.,
2011). Six PCTs were selected from the eight potential categories to ensure that a
diversity of contexts was represented, including three urban localities (A, B and C)
and three rural localities (E, F and G; Table 1). Each PCT was selected from a
different region (Strategic Health Authority) in England in order to promote
geographic dispersion.
The research employed mixed methods in order to triangulate our understanding
of the reforms. Qualitative data analysis was used to capture how people under-
stood, deﬁned and perceived the combined and relative impact of the reform policies
on behaviour, relationships and social structures. Two rounds of qualitative data
collection were undertaken across the six PCTs between October 2008 and
December 2009, resulting in 152 interviews with 112 key informants (Table 2).
Table 1. PCT classiﬁcation based on contextual variables
PCT
classiﬁcation
Degree of provider competition
(type of location)
Provider
diversity
History of
partnership working
Number
of PCTs
A High (inner-city/urban) Yes Good 9
B High (inner-city/urban) Yes Poor 4
C High (urban/suburban) No Good 47
D High (urban/suburban) No Poor 8
E Low (rural/remote) No Good 47
F Low (rural/remote) No Poor 18
G Low (rural/remote) Yes Good 12
H Low (rural/remote) Yes Poor 5
PCT = primary care trust.
Table 2. Number of interviews by PCT
Round 1 interviews Round 2 interviews
PCT Orthopaedics Other Orthopaedics Other Total interviews
A 2 5 0 1 8
B 7 18 2 8 35
C 5 15 2 8 30
E 6 17 1 9 33
F 5 10 1 6 22
G 4 18 1 1 24
Total 29 83 7 33 152
PCT = primary care trust.
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Interviewees spanned the PCT commissioner and provider arms, relevant acute
providers, general practice, host strategic health authorities and local authorities.
Interviewees were identiﬁed on the basis of their role and responsibilities and an
assumption that this would require knowledge of reform implementation. Both
senior managers and clinicians were included and one quarter of the interviewees
(29/112) was selected for their responsibility for orthopaedics. The second round of
interviews was with a selection of interviewees from the ﬁrst round; they were used
to provide some limited dynamic element examining change over time to the
analysis, and to test out key observations and ﬁndings from the ﬁrst round. The
second round interviewees were purposively chosen on the basis of the ﬁndings
from the ﬁrst round of interviews.
In line with the realistic evaluation approach, data analysis looked to examine
how the policy mechanisms interacted within local orthopaedic services. Quali-
tative data analysis paid particular attention to interviewee reﬂections on the
reforms in terms of how the reforms ‘worked’ as levers and incentives. This
analysis examined interviewee reﬂections on behaviour in the presence of incen-
tives associated with the various policy mechanisms. It also assessed contextual
factors shaping implementation, paying particular attention to any geographical
and institutional factors but also any broader constraints, such as professional or
managerial norms and values held by stakeholders. To capture this empirical
material a form of pattern coding was employed that grouped segments of
data into a smaller number of sets and themes describing the reforms and their
interactions (Miles and Huberman, 1994). The NVivo computer software
programme supported the analysis in assigning and displaying coding schemes.
Hospital Episode Statistics for the residents of the six case study PCTs were
analysed using the post-2006 PCT conﬁgurations. Admission rates between
2002/2003 and 2008/2009 were assessed, deﬁned as the number of discharges
occurring within each ﬁnancial year per 1000 resident population, using estimates
of resident population from National Statistics (Information Centre, 2009).
Changes in admission rates between 2002/2003 and 2008/2009 at PCT and main
provider level were tested for statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level for day cases,
inpatient admissions and all admissions.
Waiting times from the date of the decision to admit to the date of admission
were assessed in terms of the six-monthly mean and median at PCT level between
2002/2003 and 2008/2009. Differences in the proportion of patients waiting less
than three months in the urban PCTs and rural PCTs were compared using
standard probabilistic methods. DH monthly ‘referral to treatment’ returns for
admitted care were used to calculate the proportion of orthopaedic admissions
within the 18 week target during the three months to March 2009 for the case-
study PCTs (DH, 2009).
A regression analysis using a multilevel linear mixed-effects model was used to
examine the relationship between patient-level waiting time and PCT, controlling
for patient age and year of admission. Data on admissions in each of the six years
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to 2008/2009 were included. The model was run separately for inpatients
(137,208 admissions) and day cases (130,481 admissions). The model took
the form:
Yij ¼ β0 + β1X1ij + β2X2ij +uj + εij (1)
For i = 1,...,n admissions and j = 1,...,6 PCTs. Yij is the square root of waiting
time (from the decision to admit to the date of admission) for patient i in PCT j,
X1ij is age in years of patient i in PCT j, X2i is the year of admission of patient i in
PCT j. β0 is the intercept and εij is a random error term. In model (1) β0 + β1Xij +
β2Xij gives one overall regression line accounting for patient age and year of
admission representing the population average. Patient age and year of admission
were included in the model as continuous explanatory variables. In model
(1) uj + εiJ, uj is a random shifter of the regression line for each PCT. Square root
transformation of the waiting time data was undertaken in order to reduce the
right skewness of the distribution due to the small number of patients waiting a
comparatively long time for admission. The Kernel density estimate of the waiting
time square root transformation was closer to normality compared to the Kernel
of either the log transformation or the natural units. In order to provide an
alternative measure of PCT-level effects, a linear ﬁxed-effects regression model
was also run. However, the results were not sensitive to choice of model and so the
results of the linear ﬁxed-effects regression model are not reported here. STATA
version 12 software was used for the analysis.
Findings
The three urban PCTs can be characterised in terms of having a main provider
undertaking the majority of orthopaedic admissions (Table 3). The comparatively
larger rural PCTs are served by geographically dispersed providers, such that on
average they have less than one hospital Trust available within 30min travelling
time, and the opportunity for competition between Trusts tended to be more
limited (Table 3).
System management reforms
Given the key historical issue of access to orthopaedics, ‘system management’
marks the starting point for assessing the four reform streams.
Waiting time targets
From an explicit operational perspective, meeting the increasingly demanding
maximum waiting time targets was a clear priority. However, its status among
senior clinicians was widely questioned. Some were positive: ‘… to reduce the
waiting times to what was thought to be acceptable, down to 18 weeks…[was] a
noble aspiration; I think patients did wait too long’ (PCTG orthopaedic surgeon).
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Table 3. PCT size and percentage of orthopaedic admissions by PCT and main providers in 2008/2009
PCT
PCT size: % of total
estimated population of the six
PCTs in 2008/2009
PCT resident population: %
aged 65 years and over in
2008/2009
Main providers
(year gained FT status if
applicable) and ISTCsa
% of orthopaedic
admissions in
2008/2009
% of patients admitted within
18 weeks of referral during the three
months to March 2009b Comments
A 6% 10% NHS Trust 60% 83% The main provider ran a treatment centre
NHS Trust 30% 95% between 2002 and 2006 which was closed
due to insufﬁcient activity.
B 11% 15% Specialist FT (2007) 71% 94% Some additional activity was reported to
FT (2004) 18% 95% have been undertaken at a local private
hospital, data not available
C 8% 16% FT (2004), 95% 91% Another ISTC was operational in 2004/2005
ISTC in another PCT 2% and 2005/2006 before being closed
E 25% 21% FT (2004) 40% 59% Viewed as ‘low diversity’ because of the
NHS Trust 23% 88% large distances between providers
FT (2007) 13% 88%
NHS Trust 7% 75%
ISTC 6%
F 8% 19% FT (2004) 42% 75% Unusual because of the comparatively high
NHS Trust 11% 79% proportion of admissions at the local ISTC
specialist NHS Trust 8% 95%
ISTC 26%
Gc 42% 18% NHS Trust 28% 87% Despite the distances between providers,
FT (2006) 19% 92% which limit choice, there is a sufﬁcient range of providers
NHS Trust 15% 80% for the PCT to be viewed as ‘high diversity’
NHS Trust 9% 87%
FT (2005) 12% 75%
ISTC 1%
ISTC in another PCT 4%
PCT = primary care trust; ISTC = independent sector treatment centres; NHS = National Health Service.
aMain providers are those accounting for at least 5% of orthopaedic admissions for the PCT in 2008/2009.
bComparable data for the ISTCs were not available.
cPercentages for 2007/2008 admissions are shown here as data for one of the ISTCs were not available for 2008/2009.
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Others were unwilling to engage with the reduction of waiting times as an
appropriate objective.
All the case-study PCTs experienced reductions in waiting time from the
decision to admit over the seven years to March 2009 for elective orthopaedic
admissions. Figures 2 and 3 show the change in median andmean waiting time for
inpatient admissions. In general, the urban PCTs experienced better waiting time
performance, although the rural PCTs experienced larger falls in waiting time
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Figure 3. Mean waiting time for inpatient orthopaedic admissions (weeks)
Note: 2002/2003 data are not shown for PCT F because in that year 65% of decision to
admit records were set to the date of admission.
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Figure 2. Median waiting time for inpatient orthopaedic admissions (weeks) Note: 2002/2003
data are not shown for PCT F because in that year 65% of decision to admit records were set
to the date of admission.
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during this period. For example, in 2002/2003, 58% (6,130/10,541) of patients
were admitted within three months of the decision to admit across the urban PCTs
(A, B and C) compared to 37% (9,550/25,732) across the rural PCTs (E, F and G;
2003/2004 data were used for PCT F), and the difference in proportion was
signiﬁcant (21 percentage points difference, 95% CIs 20 to 22 percentage points).
By 2008/2009, 81% (10,737/13,241) of patients were admitted within three
months across the urban PCTs compared with 70% (28,177/39,988) across the
rural PCTs, with the urban PCTs’ performance signiﬁcantly stronger (11 percen-
tage points difference, 95% CIs 10 to 11 percentage points).
The multilevel linear models used the square root of waiting time (from the
decision to admit to the date of admission) as the dependent variable. Patient age,
year of admission and PCT were found to be statistically signiﬁcant predictors
of waiting time. Interpretation of the coefﬁcients based on the square root of
waiting time is not straightforward beyond determining whether the association
between explanatory variables and waiting time is positive or negative, and, when
comparing their relative size in the inpatient and day case results. The patient age
and year of admission coefﬁcients for the inpatient and day case models are
summarised in Table 4, and the PCT-level random effects used in the same models
are shown in Figure 4. Patient age is positively associated with waiting time, with a
larger impact on inpatient admissions compared with day cases. The year of
admission is negatively associated with waiting time, with a larger impact on
inpatient admissions compared with day cases (Table 4).
The PCT-level random effects for inpatient admissions show that the three
urban PCTs (A to C) are associated with signiﬁcantly shorter waiting times than
the average, and the three rural PCTs are all associated with signiﬁcantly longer
waiting times than the average (Figure 4). The results of the day case model are
similar, with the urban PCTs B and C experiencing shorter waiting times than the
three rural PCTs. However, PCT A’s experience was not as good as that of PCT F.
Focusing on 2008/2009, PCTs A, B and C experienced lower median and
mean waiting times for inpatient admissions, compared with PCTs E, F and G. The
regression model described above found that having controlled for patient age, the
PCT effects for PCTs E, F and G were all signiﬁcantly above average in 2008/2009.
Table 4. Multilevel linear regression models: coefﬁcients for patient age and year of admission
Admission type Fixed effect variables Coefﬁcient Standard error p-value 95% CIs
Inpatients Intercept 9.885 0.322 <0.001 9.251 to 10.519
Age 0.046 0.001 <0.001 0.044 to 0.047
Year −0.823 0.008 <0.001 −0.839 to −0.808
Day cases Intercept 9.929 0.364 <0.001 9.213 to 10.645
Age 0.007 0.001 <0.001 0.006 to 0.008
Year −0.496 0.006 <0.001 −0.509 to −0.484
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In 2008/2009, day case waiting times varied comparatively little across these PCTs.
The trend for the urban PCTs to experience lower waiting times than the rural PCTs
was maintained, with PCTs A and B experiencing lower waiting times than PCTs E
and G. The regression model found that having controlled for patient age, the PCT
effects for PCTs E and Gwere signiﬁcantly above average, and those for PCTs B and
C were signiﬁcantly below average in 2008/2009.
During the ﬁrst three months of 2009, the three urban PCTs met the target of at
least 90% of orthopaedic patients admitted within 18 weeks of referral (A 90%, B
95%, C 92%), while the rural PCT fell short (E 77%, F 85%, G 87%).
Concern was expressed about the overall approach taken to delivery on waiting
times:
I cannot understand how they can’t learn that if they set a target, and they threaten the
managers with death if they don’t meet the target, and they throw money in to the system
at the same time, that the money gets wasted! (PCT B orthopaedic surgeon).
Instead, they pointed to the need to focus on quality measures relating to disease
severity and clinical outcomes:
[There are] two big, big issues in our world. There’s the … diagnosis inﬂation issue, so
trying to get objective measures of disease severity… the bigger the diagnosis the bigger
the operation, the bigger the remuneration.… So there’s the diagnostic quality and then
there’s the therapeutic quality and at the moment we have no national guidelines for
either (orthopaedic surgeon).
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Figure 4. Inpatient and day case waiting time PCT-level random effect coefﬁcients and 95% CIs
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Policy interventions relating to redesign or the workforce were not often raised by
interviewees, but when they were, views were critical of the DH’s approach and
implementation.
Supply-side reforms
The rural PCTs experienced substantial increases in both inpatient and day case
admissions, although their day case rates remained lower than those in the two
largest urban PCTs (Table 5). Urban PCT C also experienced large increases in
inpatient and day case admissions. PCTs B and A experienced comparatively
small changes in inpatient and day case admission rates over time (Table 5).
However, they also mark the extremes in terms of admission rates. PCT B had the
highest admission rate during the four years from 2002/2003 and strongest
waiting time performance, and would arguably have incurred least pressure to
subsequently increase activity (Powell et al., 2011). PCT A has a markedly
younger resident population compared to the other case-study PCTs, along with
the lowest admission rate since 2002/2003 (Tables 3 and 5).
One surgeon suggested that some of the increase in admissions could be
attributed to a greater proportion of patients presenting for surgical treatment as
waiting times fell: ‘one of my best treatments used to be a waiting list… because in
the days when I had a six to 12 month waiting list, I probably had at least 10,
15 per cent of patients who for one reason or another came off the list, the
Table 5. Summary changes in elective orthopaedic admission rates
2002/2003 2008/2009
PCT Ratea
Number of
orthopaedic
admissions Ratea
Number of
orthopaedic
admissions
Difference in rate
(95% CIs)
between years
% change
between
years
Inpatients
A 4.1 690 4.3 734 0.2 (−0.2 to 0.6) 5.1
B 7.3 2445 7.0 2351 −0.3 (−0.7 to 0.1) −4.6
C 5.4 1246 7.1 1695 1.7 (1.3 to 2.2) 31.9
E 7.0 4981 9.4 7102 2.4 (2.1 to 2.7) 34.2
F 4.8 1119 7.1 1672 2.3 (1.8 to 2.7) 47.4
G 7.0 8733 9.1 11603 2.1 (1.9 to 2.3) 29.6
Day cases
A 2.3 398 3.1 542 0.8 (0.5 to 1.2) 34.5
B 10.2 3402 12.4 4174 2.2 (1.7 to 2.7) 21.7
C 10.6 2469 16.0 3832 5.4 (4.7 to 6.0) 50.5
E 5.1 3596 9.0 6827 4.0 (3.7 to 4.3) 78.7
F 4.1 946 8.5 2012 4.5 (4.0 to 4.9) 109.9
G 4.8 5995 8.7 11165 3.9 (3.7 to 4.1) 81.6
PCT = primary care trust.
aPer thousand registered population.
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majority of those reported that their symptoms had got better’ or were less likely
to choose private practice.
The most talked about and tangible policy intervention intended to increase
supply was the introduction of ISTCs. The three rural PCTs and one of the urban
PCTs were affected, and by 2008/2009 ISTCs accounted for between 1% and 6%
of admissions in three of the PCTs and 26% in PCT F (Table 3). Staff working in
NHS hospitals were typically concerned by the introduction of ISTCs, and the
presence of ISTCs has been viewed as highly controversial in some localities.
The way in which the initial ISTC contracts were centrally agreed, with revenue
largely disconnected from volume, and at premium to national tariffs, led to
signiﬁcant criticism: ‘it makes a lot of people grit their teeth… it was handled…
very much out of our hands, it was handled centrally and that was the problem’
(PCT commissioner).
The response to ISTCs was specialty speciﬁc. For example, in 2008, a big ISTC
opened close to a Trust serving PCT G; ‘that's the ﬁrst time…we’ve ever had any
competition [here]’. In some areas, such as hernia repair, the Trust seconded staff
to the ISTC to provide the activity: ‘I think we’d all recognise that's actually much
better for patients to have what is routine surgery in… amuch better…, dedicated
elective environment’. However, it was viewed as important to retain orthopae-
dics in order to maintain the viability of its trauma service. The impact of ISTCs
leaving other providers ‘with a rump of complex high co-morbidity patients’ was
consistently viewed negatively by staff from affected providers.
The ISTC in PCT F undertook more total knee replacements than the
PCT’s main provider in 2008/2009 (154 and 101, respectively). The mean age of
patients undergoing a TKR was 66.5 years at the ISTC compared with 79.9 at the
main provider, and the difference in mean was signiﬁcant (−13.4 years, 95%
CIs −14.8 to −12.0 years). Similarly, the mean length of stay was lower at the
ISTC compared with the main provider (4.5 and 6.7 days, respectively), and
the difference in mean was signiﬁcant (−2.2 days, 95% CIs −3.2 to −1.2 days).
These ﬁndings suggest that the ISTC was treating less complex patients than the
main provider.
In this case, the local FT main provider acknowledged that it had faced
a problem ‘as some waiting lists started to stretch’. However, despite the
unusually extensive use of the ISTC, this FT’s waiting time performance
was one of the weakest of all the main providers across the six case-study
PCTs (Table 5). Furthermore, it appeared that the FT had not responded to this
exposure to competition by challenging its own working practices. Despite
the large proportion of total activity undertaken by the ISTC in this locality, an
orthopaedic consultant from the PCT’s main provider noted: ‘in fact,… it hasn’t
actually reduced the amount of work that we are doing, we are still working
to capacity’.
In several PCTs, there was an expectation that contracts would be renewed, but
on the same basis as any other provider, without guaranteed activity. The impact
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of ISTCs has been wider than their limited contribution to capacity, in some
localities prompting reassessment of the potential for competition between
providers: the ISTC ‘really is shaking up the health economy. … on the positive
side it did make the surgeons think in the NHS perspective’ (PCT G manager).
Both NHS Trusts and FTs shared an incentive to maximise revenue and the
drive for FT status, in combination with PbR, was widely viewed as having
incentivised NHS providers to treat more patients. The ﬁnancial interest
of providers has been in line with the national policy intention to deliver
shorter waiting times by increasing activity. However, the FT policy was also
viewed as highly contentious, having ‘fragmented the health service and to get the
best value out of the healthcare system, we need to bring it back together’.
This issue was both expressed by PCT commissioners and acknowledged by the
FTs themselves.
From a system perspective, it has been increasingly recognised that some
localities have cost pressures, driven in part through increases in activity and
funded capacity in specialties including orthopaedics, that need to be addressed.
This concern was most clearly expressed in the rural PCTs, which tended to have
comparatively weak ratings for ﬁnancial performance and a larger number of
orthopaedic service providers.
Demand-side reforms
Commissioning
Commissioning in relation to orthopaedics has played a minor role and stake-
holders expressed doubt about the ability of the commissioning function to
manage demand. PCT commissioners appeared to be preoccupied with addressing
the WCC agenda and local competency scores as a whole, rather than seeking to
inﬂuence their acute providers.
There were examples of community-based triage services being implemented
across some of the case-study PCTs, which in general focused on changing
access to orthopaedic consultants in order to improve their ‘conversion rate’,
the proportion of new outpatients subsequently receiving treatment, thereby
increasing the proportion of their time available for undertaking surgery. In one
well-established scheme, consultants were paid on a sessional basis to see selected
patients in community settings. Here, the NHS provider Trusts were willing to
forgo some outpatient revenue, so long as ‘their’ consultants encouraged patients
requiring surgery to book their treatment with them. In one case, this was reported
to have resulted in an NHS Trust agreeing especially short waiting times for
admission for a particular surgeon who was offering patients a choice between the
Trust and a private hospital.
One scheme reported undertaking a study, which suggested an increase in
treatment thresholds had occurred compared with other localities, but in that PCT
the commissioners were assessing performance on conversion rates rather than
398 H U G H M C L E O D E T A L .
treatment rates. Hence, there was no direct attempt to manage the growth in
surgical activity. Explicit management of treatment thresholds has typically
not been implemented by PCT commissioners. NHS providers have appointed
additional consultants and commissioners have had to accept the consequences:
‘Every time we appoint someone with a special interest … it attracts more
work. I don’t know, I really don’t know how the mechanism happens’ (PCT F
orthopaedic surgeon).
Nevertheless, some PCT commissioners expressed some conﬁdence in being
able move beyond ‘payment by activity’ towards ‘payment by results’ and estab-
lish more direct links with measures of impact on health outcomes. This aspiration
was matched with a view that practice-based commissioners had the potential to
play a key role in developing patient pathways, but in practice, the initiative
appeared to be far from their grasp.
Choice
The choice agenda was often raised in relation to orthopaedic services. Ortho-
paedic consultants tended to see themselves as the key criterion for choice:
‘the most important thing … is the person who’s actually wielding the knife ….
I thinkmost patients want… a local surgeon…who has a reputation to protect…
[in contrast to] somebody coming in for six weeks from Sweden or South Africa
hacking their way through a list of patients and then clearing off again’. The
response of an NHS hospital to choice being offered between it and a private
hospital in a triage service, noted above, demonstrates an extreme outcome
for choice of surgeon. More generally, tension for PCTs between allowing
patient choice and ensuring that ISTC contracts were utilised was often cited.
For example, it was reported that patients were ‘bullied’ via repeated phone
calls from referral management centres into changing their choice to the local
treatment centre: an example of a ‘dichotomy between commissioning and
choice’ (manager).
Transactional reforms
In addition to the issues noted above, several factors relating to the PbR tariffs
were cited by orthopaedic staff. Some tariffs were criticised for promoting inap-
propriate incentives. For example, a surgeon reported being ‘berated’ for using a
high cost prosthesis, which was viewed as being cost-effective. At the same time,
this interviewee also noted that PbR was fuelling consideration of treatment
options with cost-saving consequences, such as partial knee replacement instead
of total knee replacement. However, the surgeon also emphasised pressure to
undertake proﬁtable surgery of doubtful efﬁcacy:
… we are being strongly incentivised… to do procedures that are of limited or negligible
beneﬁt…HRG4 strongly rewards us to do arthroscopic surgery on arthritic joints which
is cheap but doesn’t work and that’s barmy isn’t it?
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PbR was positively viewed by senior managers in NHS acute providers. For
some, there was a sense of PbR contributing to greater provider-level efﬁciency.
However, there was also appreciation of a bigger picture:
… our Trust … is making a great proﬁt but the PCT is making a great loss and for us,
ﬁnancially, if the PCT goes bust, whatever that means, that puts us as their main provider
in a rubbish situation (PCT E).
At another large case-study, the PCT commissioner reported limiting providers’
surpluses bymoving away from PbR in order to fund deﬁcits: ‘We’re now closer to
block contacts, or less variable contracts, than we were before’.
Discussion
The main concern for the quality of orthopaedics was waiting times, and to the
extent that the urban PCTs experienced shorter waiting times than the rural PCTs,
our ﬁndings on waiting times are broadly in line with the econometric group of
competition studies (although Gaynor et al. (2011) did not ﬁnd a waiting time
response to competition policy). However, the rural PCTs ‘closed the gap’ on
waiting times to a considerable degree, throughout the period in which New
Labour sought to supersede ‘central control’with ‘market-orientated’ programme
theories (Mays et al., 2011). This ﬁnding could be viewed as a policy success, but
invites consideration of why the rural PCTs did not achieve better access, given
the DH’s focus on this measure for orthopaedics. Overall, the experience of the
case-study PCTs suggests that provider competition has had limited impact on the
provision of Orthopaedic services.
Our ﬁndings illuminate stakeholders’ perceptions of the interaction of the
reform process. Most interviewees were aware of the potential of choice and the
threat of competition, even in largely monopolistic markets. However, in terms of
the views expressed by local stakeholders, the potential impact of market forces, in
which incumbent providers compete on the basis of comparative quality in the
face of ﬁxed prices, was overshadowed by the arrival of ISTCs affecting the three
rural PCTs and one of the urban PCTs. Here, in response to this nationally
determined initiative, local commissioners were faced with a pressing challenge to
persuade GPs and patients to use this premium-cost capacity in preference to their
other providers. With one exception, the contribution made by the ISTCs was
limited. NHS providers were affected, but only to a limited extent because they
still enjoyed the lion share of the considerable increases in admissions. Even in
PCT (F) where the ISTC accounted for a quarter of orthopaedic admissions, the
main local NHS provider experienced growth in admissions, and staff appeared
remarkably unconcerned by their competitor. This ﬁnding conﬁrms that in a
context of there being ‘more than enough [work] to go round’ competition-related
incentives are weak (Frosini et al., 2012: 20; Greener, 2012). The introduction of
ISTCs was not viewed within the affected localities as contributing to a coherent
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approach to promoting efﬁciency, a perspective for which there is wider evidence
(Street et al., 2010).
In the context of increasing NHS resources, the combined impact of national
targets, tariffs and the FT agenda allowed providers’ proﬁt-maximising incen-
tives to dominate service delivery. In the absence of widely implemented
robust demand management tools, it appears likely that treatment thresholds
changed, and PCT commissioners have not been well placed to counter providers’
incentives. The view that the supply and demand streams were ‘unbalanced’
strongly echoes the national perception that the local commissioning function
was weak (Audit Commission and Healthcare Commission, 2008). Certainly, the
two largest case-study PCTs, which were both rural and comparatively weak
performers, were disadvantaged by having to contend with the full burden of
major structural change following the 2006 PCT reconﬁgurations. Nevertheless,
the commissioners’ focus on conversion rates rather than treatment thresholds,
suggests limited resolve to engage on clinical issues (Frankel et al., 1999). Overall,
the case-study experience suggests that locality-based commissioning relating to
orthopaedics was not likely to ‘catch-up’ and then ‘stand-up’ and effectively
inﬂuence use of available resources.
The rural case-study PCTs’ experiences during this period of reform illustrate
the constrained potential of competition in the face of differing local contexts.
This ﬁnding is echoed by Garber (2011: 65) who, while advocating competition,
concluded that ‘we simply don’t know which approaches [to commissioning and
the use of incentives to reward providers] work best’. The DH claimed that market
forces would deliver more than what could be achieved via targets and perfor-
mance management (DH, 2005). International experience suggests that the
introduction of market principles has led to the reassertion of state regulatory
authority (Hassenteufel et al., 2010). Across the six case-study PCTs, concern over
national waiting time targets appeared to be a more important long-standing
inﬂuence on Orthopaedics staff than the cumulative impact of market-orientated
policies. However, even the ‘targets-and-terror’ associated with performance
managing waiting times did not necessarily prevail over providers’ self-interests.
To the extent that there is a trade-off for providers between meeting access targets
andmaximising admissions and revenue, providers in the rural localities appeared
to be less concerned about waiting time performance. This may be because
they were less exposed to competition. However, the rural PCTs highlight a clear
distinction between providers’ interests and those of the wider NHS, despite an
ostensibly dominant policy imperative to deliver access targets.
The Coalition Government, formed by the Conservative and Liberal Democrat
parties in May 2010, has committed the NHS to further market reforms, seeking
to extend opportunities for supply-side competition, while also endorsing the FT
model for NHS providers and locality-based commissioning (Gregory et al.,
2012). The language relating to national targets has changed, but a high proﬁle
remains attached to meeting national waiting time standards. In terms of these
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components of the policy landscape, the challenges experienced in the case-
study PCTs remain just as relevant under the Coalition Government. What can
potentially counter the dominance of FTs to dictate service delivery, as exempliﬁed
by the observation that the only constraint on their proﬁt maximising behaviour
would be the consequences associated with the local PCT ‘going bust, whatever
that means’? The newNHS England (formerly known as the NHSCommissioning
Board) has the potential to deliver a powerful leadership role and could herald a
substantial move away from reliance on local commissioning and provider
competition to inﬂuence provider behaviour. For example, if developed by NHS
England, model pathways for joint replacement cases incorporating treatment
threshold criteria could strengthen opportunities to hold FTs to account. How-
ever, as long as the FT model is pursued, a price may be paid for the potential
conﬂict between their organisation-level incentives and those of the wider NHS.
The pragmatic adoption of the realist evaluation framework provided a
productive basis for our analysis using multiple data sources and methods.
The stakeholders’ stated views of the reforms, which tended to reﬂect the
circumstances of their local roles, rather than any system-wide overview of the
reform streams, provided a rich basis for comparative analysis complemented
by the quantitative measures of change over time. Nevertheless, the practical
limitations of using the realist framework must be acknowledged as we attempted
to understand the extent to which reform processes inﬂuenced the delivery of
orthopaedic services. The study focused on the main themes that emerged from
the stakeholder interviews, and does not present a complete analysis of all
reform policies.
Conclusion
New Labour sought to justify a change in dominant programme theory from one
of ‘central control’, to one based on ‘market forces’: ‘we can use targets and
performance management to drive up standards. But it can only ever take us some
of the way’ (DH, 2005: pi). This study suggests that the impact of market forces
remained limited: the views expressed by hospital managers and clinicians suggest
that they were not highly motivated to change working practices on the basis of
actual or potential provider competition, despite the major effort made to expand
local capacity via ISTCs. Instead, national access targets continued to play a more
tangible role in inﬂuencing service delivery in both urban and rural localities.
The resulting mixture of programme theories was not viewed as comprising a
coherent and mutually supportive set of arrangements. Moreover, the rural PCTs
in particular illustrate the dominance of the FT policy such that provider-level
incentives were viewed as being more inﬂuential than national targets or the
efforts made by local commissioners to inﬂuence service delivery. The reports of
commissioners moving away from PbR funding towards less activity-sensitive
contracts indicate a much more blunt intervention on the part of commissioners in
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their attempt to manage resources. Our analysis of stakeholders’ views of
the reform process suggests that policymakers have not yet achieved an appro-
priate balance of incentives within local health economies. NHS England could
help realise this, if it engages more directly with FTs, rather than relying on
competition rhetoric.
Acknowledgment
This is an independent article using data from a study funded by the Policy
Research Programme in the Department of Health. The views expressed are not
necessarily those of the Department.
References
Allen, P., S. Turner, W. Bartlett, V. Perotin, G. Matchaya and B. Zamora (2012), ‘Provider
diversity in the English NHS: a study of recent developments in four local health
economies’, Journal of Health Services Research & Policy, 17(S1): 23–30.
Appleby, J., C. Ham, C. Imison and M. Jennings (2010), Improving NHS Productivity,
London: Kings Fund.
Audit Commission and Healthcare Commission (2008), Is the Treatment Working? Progress
with the NHS System Reform Programme, London: Audit Commission.
Bevan, G. and C. Hood (2006), ‘Targets and gaming in health care in England’, Public
Administration, 84(3): 517–538.
Bevan, G. and M. Skellern (2011), ‘Does competition between hospitals improve clinical
quality? A review of evidence from two eras of competition in the English NHS’, British
Medical Journal, 343: d6470.
Bloom, N., C. Propper, S. Seiler and J. Van Reenen (2011), The impact of competition on
management quality: evidence from public hospitals. London: London School of Eco-
nomics and Political Science.
Brereton, L. and J. Gubb (2010), Refusing Treatment: the NHS and Market-based Reform,
London: Civitas.
Brereton, L. and V. Vasoodaven (2010), The Impact of the NHS Market, London: Civitas.
Cooper, Z., S. Gibbons, S. Jones and A.McGuire (2011), ‘Does hospital competition save lives?
Evidence from the English NHS patient choice reforms’, Economic Journal, 121:
F228–F260.
Cooper, Z., S. Gibbons, S. Jones and A. McGuire (2012), Does competition improve
public hospitals’ efﬁciency? Evidence from a quasi-experiment in the English
National Health Service. CEP Discussion Paper 1125. London: Centre for Economic
Performance.
Department of Health (DH) (2000), The NHS Plan: A Plan for Investment a Plan for Reform,
London: The Stationery Ofﬁce.
Department of Health (2002),Delivering the NHS Plan: Next Steps on Investment, Next Steps
on Reform, London: Department of Health.
Department of Health (2005), Health Reform in England: Update and Next Steps, London:
The Stationery Ofﬁce.
Department of Health (2007), World Class Commissioning: Competences, London: Depart-
ment of Health.
Perspectives on the policy ‘black box’ 403
Department of Health (2009), Archive – Commissioner Based Hospital Waiting Lists
and Waiting Times. http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130107105354/http://
www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Statistics/Performancedataandstatistics/
HospitalWaitingTimesandListStatistics/DH_087742 [5 October 2009].
Department for Transport (2007), Department for Transport Annual Report 2007, London:
The Stationery Ofﬁce.
Dixon, A., R. Robertson, J. Appleby, P. Burge, N. Devlin and H.Magee (2010), Patient Choice.
How Patients Choose and How Providers Respond, London: King’s Fund.
Enthoven, A. (1985), Reﬂections on the Management of the National Health Service, London:
The Nufﬁeld Provincial Hospitals Trust.
Farrar, S., D. Yi,M. Sutton,M. Chalkley, J. Sussex and T. Scott (2009), ‘Has payment by results
affected the way that English hospitals provide care?’, British Medical Journal, 339:
b3047 doi:10.1136/bmj.b3047.
Frankel, S., J. Eachus, N. Pearson, R. Greenwood, P. Chan, T. Peters, J. Donovan, G. Smith and
P. Dieppe (1999), ‘Population requirements for primary hip-replacement surgery: a cross-
sectional study’, The Lancet, 353: 13004–13009.
Frosini, F., A. Dixon and R. Robertson (2012), ‘Competition in the NHS: a provider perspective’,
Journal of Health Services Research & Policy, 17(S1): 16–22.
Garber, A. (2011), Competition, Integration and Incentives: The Quest for Efﬁciency in the
England NHS, London: Nufﬁeld Trust.
Gaynor, M., R. Moreno-Serra and C. Propper (2011), Death by Market Power: Reform,
Competition and Patient Outcomes in the National Health Service CMPO No. 10/242,
Bristol: University of Bristol.
Gaynor, M., R. Moreno-Serra and C. Propper (2012), ‘Can competition improve outcomes in
UK health care? Lessons from the past two decades’, Journal of Health Services Research
& Policy, 17(S1): 49–54.
Gravelle, H., R. Santos, L. Siciliani and R. Goudie (2012),Hospital Quality Competition Under
Fix Prices CHE Research Paper 80 York: Centre for Health Economics.
Greener, I. (2012), ‘Unpacking the evidence on competition and outcomes in the NHS in
England’, Journal of Health Services Research & Policy , 17(4): 193–194.
Greenhalgh, T., C. Humphrey, J. Hughes, F. Macfarlane, C. Butler and R. Pawson (2009),
‘How do you modernize a health service? A realist evaluation of whole-scale transfor-
mation in London’,Milbank Quarterly 87(2): 391–416.
Gregory, S., A. Dixon and C. Ham (2012), Health Policy Under the Coalition Government,
London: King’s Fund.
Harrison, A. and J. Appleby (2005), The War on Waiting for Hospital Treatment, London:
King’s Fund.
Hassenteufel, P., M. Smyrl, W. Genieys and F. Moreno-Fuentes (2010), ‘Programmatic actors
and the transformation of European health care states’, Journal of Health Politics, Policy
and Law, 35(4): 517–538.
Hunter, D. (2011), ‘Change of government: one more big bang health care reform in England’s
National Health Service’, International Journal of Health Services, 41(1): 159–174.
Information Centre (2009), Compendium of Clinical and Health Indicators, www.nchod.
nhs.uk [5 October 2009].
Marsh, D. and A. McConnell (2010), ‘Towards a framework for establishing policy success’,
Public Administration, 88(2): 564–583.
Mays, N., A. Dixon and L. Jones (2011),Understanding New Labour's Market Reforms of the
English NHS, London: King’s Fund.
404 H U G H M C L E O D E T A L .
Millar, R., M. Powell and A. Dixon (2012), ‘What was the programme theory of New Labour's
Health System Reforms?’, Journal of Health Services Research & Policy, 17(S1): 7–15.
Miles, M. and A. Huberman (1994), Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded Sourcebook.
2nd edn, London: Sage.
Naylor, C. and S. Gregory (2009), Independent Sector Treatment Centres, London: King’s
Fund.
Pawson, R. and N. Tilley (1997), Realistic Evaluation, London: Sage.
Pawson, R., T. Greenhalgh, G. Harvey and K. Walshe (2005), ‘Realist review – a new method
of systematic review designed for complex policy interventions’, Journal of Health
Services Research & Policy, 10(S1): 21–34.
Pollock, A., A. Macfarlane, G. Kirkwood, F. Majeed, I. Greener, C. Morelli, S. Boyle, H.
Mellett, S. Godden, D. Price and P. Brhlikova (2011), ‘No evidence that patient choice in
the NHS saves lives’, The Lancet, 378: 2057–2060.
Powell, M., R. Millar, A. Mulla, H. Brown, C. Fewtrell, H. McLeod, N. Goodwin, A. Dixon
and C. Naylor (2011), Comparative Case Studies of Health Reform in England: Report
Submitted to the Department of Health Policy Research Programme, Birmingham:
Health Services Management Centre.
Propper, C. (2012), ‘Competition, incentives and the English NHS’, Health Economics, 21:
33–40.
Propper, C., S. Burgess and D. Gossage (2008), ‘Competition and quality: evidence from the
NHS internal market 1991-9’, The Economic Journal, 118: 138–170.
Propper, C., S. Burgess and K. Green (2004), ‘Does competition between hospitals improve the
quality of care? Hospital death rates and the NHS internal market’, Journal of Public
Economics, 88: 1247–1272.
Smith, J., J. Dixon, N. Mays, H. McLeod, N. Goodwin, S. McClelland, R. Lewis and S. Wyke
(2005), ‘Practice-based commissioning: applying the evidence’, British Medical Journal,
331: 1397–1399.
Street, A., P. Sivey, A. Mason, M. Miraldo and L. Siciliani (2010), ‘Are English treatment
centres treating less complex patients?’, Health Policy, 94: 150–157.
Perspectives on the policy ‘black box’ 405
